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Abstrak 
 Abad ke-21 mendekati akhir dekade keduanya. Polaritas dunia masih terlihat condong 
ke Washington walaupun banyak yang merasa kekuatan Beijing akan menandinginya. Di lain 
pihak, kita tidak bisa melupakan reaksi dan strategi para regional power di jalur ekspansi Belt 
and Road Initiative Tiongkok. New Delhi, Jakarta dan Canberra sudah mulai menunjukkan 
keinginan mereka untuk bersatu menangkal ekspansi Beijing setidaknya setahun terakhir ini. 
Pembahasan yang dibawa akan sesekali berfokus pada bagaimana konsep regional 
hegemony, structural realism, dan sphere of influence pada saat ini sedang digunakan oleh 
ketiga regionalpower terutama dalam menangkal ekspansi Tiongkok di Laut Natuna Utara. 
Regional hegemony akan menjelaskan pada kadar tertentu ‘kedaulatan regional’ ketiga 
negara, structural realism akan menjelaskan alasan realis ketiga negara untuk bersatu, dan 
sphere of influence akan menjelaskan mengapa proyeksi regionalisme ketiga negara 
dieksekusi secara terbatas. Riset ini akan mengupas tiga pertanyaan. Mengapa ketiga negara 
mau bekerja sama? Apakah tiap negara memiliki kontribusi efektif terhadap tujuan mereka 
bersama? 
 
 
Historical Hegemons: An Introduction 
 India, Indonesia, and Australia has been the prominent country in their respective 
regions. India has always been seen as one of those prominent country considering their 
significant number of population, their large territory, and their massive economy. Indonesia 
on the other hand, was an understandable danger during their early years with a large 
territory, Soviet influence, and an aggressive leader at the helm. Australia is still commonly 
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seen as the deputy marshall to the influence of the United States in the surrounding area even 
though lately their economic influence, cooperation with the US, and humanitarian 
interventions in the region has been challenged.1 Their prominence can be argued to be 
constantly under fire whether by rival countries, a hampering regional procedure, or an 
incoherent distant ally. This paper will focus specifically on how all of those problems are 
adding more stress to the ever looming threat of chinese influence to the three countries. By 
way of security, economy, politics, or military, Beijing has posed quite a significant threat to 
their regional prominence. South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific has their respective 
hegemon preparing and the three of them has proposed a triage of cooperation to counter 
China. 
 South Asia most of the time has seen the contestation of powers between Pakistan and 
India. At their births, during the cold war, during their acquisition of nuclear weapons, and 
even in the 21st century, their rivalry was coloring the politics of South Asia in their unique 
way. Even though Ali Jinnah wanted an at least peaceful relation between the two, his 
succeeding colleagues fail or was not in favor in safeguarding Jinnah’s vision to fruition. 
Instead we kept on seeing skirmishes in Jammu and Kashmir, frequent anti-India rhetoric in 
Pakistani elections,2 to the general failure of SAARC in stimulating regional cooperation and 
trade.3 Perhaps that situation then gave the output of being one of the regions in the world 
without proper regionalism in place.4 
 Southeast Asia on the other hand, has a very different geopolitical situation. This is 
due to the fact that the region is comprised of the mainland area and the string of 
archipelagoes called the insular Southeast Asia.5 The mainland area is comprised of various 
states such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand while the insular - archipelagic area 
is almost fully comprised of Indonesian territory. ASEAN’s establishment was seen by many 
as a miracle in the region considering the many differing political, religious, and social views 
                                                          
1 Joanne Wallis, “Hollow hegemon: Australia’s declining influence in the Pacific,” East Asia Forum, 21 
September, 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/21/hollow-hegemon-australias-declining-role-in-the-
pacific/. 
2 “’Any friend of Modi’s is a traitor’: Anti-India rhetoric played a role in Pakistan elections,” scroll.in, 
https://scroll.in/article/888135/any-friend-of-modis-is-a-traitor-the-role-anti-india-rhetoric-played-in-pakistans-
elections. 
3 Jawad Falak, “Implacable Failures of the SAARC,” Center For Strategic and Contemporary Research, 21 
June, 2017, https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/implacable-failures-of-the-saarc/. 
4 Partha S Ghosh, “Cooperation in South Asia: Region without Regionalism,” Economic & Political Weekly, 6 
August, 2018, https://www.epw.in/journal/2016/32/special-articles/region-without-regionalism.html. 
5 William H. Frederick and Thomas R. Leinbach, “Southeast Asia,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Southeast-Asia. 
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in its member states. This is also considering that before the establishment of ASEAN, there 
are a notable amount of conflicts in the region such as the Burmese-Siamese wars, the First 
Indochina war, and the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation. The sheer size of Indonesia and 
the looming threat of its gigantic opportunity prompted some scholar to argue that ASEAN 
was made also in part to contain Indonesia ‘s possibility to be the big and tyrannical member 
state through its consensus-based mechanism.6 
 Oceania and the Pacific possess the might of the Commonwealth of Australia that can 
be argued to have the similar strength of the United States. Australia can be seen to have 
provided ample interventions in the region such as during the Vietnam war and the First 
Malayan Emergency. Not to mention that Australia has ANZAC and ANZUS that shields the 
region with a significant amount of military power. This could in turn contribute to the 
accumulation of Australia’s capacity to provide humanitarian intervention to those countries 
in need, particularly in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Pacific. Australia was quite recently 
even mentioned to have the possibility to join ASEAN.7 Even though many scholars view the 
invitation to be a mere good gesture, it is still an exemplar to their diplomatic capability, or 
their skills in maintaining good relations with their northern neighbors.8 
 The three countries’ common threat, China, was historically taking several 
consecutive pivotal events throughout their days. From the catastrophe of the Great Leap 
Forward, their civil war against the Kuomintang for the domination of the Communist Party, 
and the Sino-Soviet split. The turning point is believed to come from the 1970s according to 
several scholars, in regards to their market reforms.9 Their stable market improvement over 
the decades, the fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and also the continuing 
decline of America’s unipolar moment can be argued to be some of the factors to contribute 
to their rise.10 
 Before delving further it is important to explain what china’s Belt and Road Initiative 
is. Firstly, the BRI is a series of investment plans to bring stimulus to several countries with 
                                                          
6 Nik Luqman, “Is ASEAN Consensus A Blessing or Curse – or Both?,” ASEAN News, 19 July, 2015, 
http://www.aseannews.net/asean-consensus-blessing-curse/. 
7 “Pertama Kali, Presiden Jokowi Dukung Australia Masuk ASEAN,” Tempo.co, 16 March, 2018, 
https://dunia.tempo.co/read/1070224/pertama-kali-presiden-jokowi-dukung-australia-masuk-asean. 
8 Angaindrakumar Gnanasagaran, “Behind Australia’s invitation to join ASEAN,” The ASEAN Post, 19 March, 
2018, https://theaseanpost.com/article/behind-australias-invitation-join-asean. 
9 G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, February, 2008, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west. 
10 Kevin Rudd, “Are China and the US doomed to conflict? | Kevin Rudd -YouTube,” TED, 1 April, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XQ1onjXJK0. 
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slowing economies.11 It also covers the cooperation between Beijing and several other 
countries in materializing their infrastructure projects whether it is making fibre optic wires 
for internet, building ports, or  naval bases. All of these efforts can be argued to be the main 
mission in China’s peaceful rise concept in gaining global hegemony. This is of course 
welcomed with United States resistance towards this contestation of the status quo. 
 Funnily enough, the three countries also have a common ally, which is the United 
States. It is important to note that each of the countries have different levels and extent of 
friendship towards the United States, with arguably minimum commonalities in regards to 
their similarities in international relations with the United States. For example, India goes 
way back from their Cold War Non-Aligned Movement stance which was frowned upon to a 
certain extent by some United States officials, their complications during the Bangladeshi 
independence struggle in 1971, to their current standing which is being the second largest 
trading partner of the United States. Indonesia has a different story, which was painted with 
hatred towards western countries in regards to their imperialism, then changed with a New 
Order regime which was favoring the United States, to its current political climate in which 
the citizens view the United States as the prime example of greedy developed states. 
Australia can be argued to be the only state with the most consistent relations with the United 
States, even though recently they have to carefully thread with Washington regarding several 
issues about China.12 
 With all of that said, the subsequent discussion shall encompass the dissection of the 
chinese maneuvers, regional hegemonic obstacles, and possible points of opportunities to 
assist by the other two countries. It would also to a certain extent, seek to observe the triage’s 
contribution to the United States’ efforts to counter chinese hegemonism in Asia. 
The Three Leviathans 
 Part One: New Delhi’s Political Gap 
 The Republic of India can be argued to get disturbances from Beijing mainly from 
their precision maneuvers towards its neighbors. Namely towards Pakistan, Maldives, and 
                                                          
11 Lily Kuo and Niko Kommenda, “What is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?,” The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-
explainer. 
12 “Australia warns against US-China tensions,” The Strait Times, 1 November, 2018, 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/australia-warns-against-us-china-tensions. 
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towards the overall region.13 In a region without regionalism, contested hegemonism with 
Pakistan, and an overall low intra-regional trade, India must race against the increase of 
China’s influence in the region.14 Interestingly, China made an arguably mutually beneficial 
cooperation with Pakistan, while arranging a detrimental agreement with Maldives which 
would potentially engulf the country with chinese debt for years to come.15 
 With the case of South Asia, China has been increasingly cooperating with the Islamic 
Republic. One example can be taken from their endeavor to construct the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor to connect China’s city of Kashgar with the Pakistani Gwadar port which 
are 3,000 kilometers away.16 This is of course part of the Belt and Road Initiative that goes 
through South Asia. Maldives on the other hand, is in a dire situation due to their agreement 
of debt acquisition from Beijing. It is noted that Maldives’ foreign debt that is owed to China 
is over 70 percent with loan intetest that is more than 20 percent of their budget.17 Another 
danger in the region can be seen in how Nepal is also pursued by China’s grip by their 
internet infrastructure cooperation with fibre optic cables from Beijing according to an 
analysis by the Centre for China Analysis & Strategy.18 The same document also mentions 
how India’s approach is portrayed by Chinese military media as expansionist and prone to 
interfering their neighbors’ domestic affairs. 
 India’s hegemonically regional response can be argued to be hampered by several 
things. One of which is of course Pakistan, and also the currently low intra-regional trade. 
Pakistan’s hegemonic contestation with India in regards to South Asian leadership is tipped 
due to Chinese cooperation with Pakistan. The low intra-regional trade might also contribute 
to the hardships that India faces in combating the increase of Chinese investment and trade in 
the country. With that said, those are two of the contributing factors to challenge Indian 
hegemonic influence in the region. 
                                                          
13 Zee Ayurveda, “After China, maldives ropes in Pakistan for Power,” The Times of India, 6 July, 2018, 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/after-china-maldives-ropes-in-pakistan-for-
power/articleshow/64889956.cms. 
14 “The Potential of Intra-regional Trade for South Asia,” The World Bank, 24 May, 2018, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/05/24/the-potential-of-intra-regional-trade-for-south-asia. 
15 Sanjeev Miglani and Mohamed Junayd, “After building spree, just how much does the Maldives owe 
China?,” Reuters, 23 November, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-politics-china/after-
building-spree-just-how-much-does-the-maldives-owe-china-idUSKCN1NS1J2. 
16 Mercy A. Kuo, “China-Pakistan Relations: Challenging US Global Leadership,” The Diplomat, 30 May, 
2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/china-pakistan-relations-challenging-us-global-leadership/. 
17 Jayadeva Ranade, “SITUATION IN MALDIVES COULD POTENTIALLY FURTHER RAISE INDIA-
CHINA TENSIONS,” Centre for China Analysis & Strategy, 19 February, 2018, 
https://ccasindia.org/Maldives.pdf. 
18 Ibid. 
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 Islamabad has repeatedly try to counterbalance New Delhi in regards to leadership in 
the region. Some scholars have noted that Pakistan is executing a maneuver of area of denial 
to cut the access and movement of India towards accomplishing economic and military 
means.19 Over the course of their rivalry, several acts of terrorism are even permitted by each 
sides as long as it undermines the power of the other. This is in the sense of turning the other 
way when these acts are conducted. 
 Another challenge is the low intra-regional trade. An analysis done by the Centre for 
Strategic and Contemporary Resereach found this can be correlated to the failure of the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’s (SAARC) lack in their ability to promote intra-
regional cooperation and connectivity. Their intra-regional trade is only at 5 percent and their 
member states have low ranking on the human development index. The document also stated 
how both the Indo-Pakistan rivalry and the lack in infrastructure to connect member states is 
the main reason for this detrimental fact.20  
 Seeing all of these obstacles and challenges, India may face them alone, but I believe 
that Indonesia and Australia’s contribution towards countering chinese influence can further 
give strength to their collective efforts. I believe that India’s economic success in recent times 
will be able to counter China’s economic influence although not in a completely symmetrical 
way against their Belt and Road Initiative. Through India’s practice of increased intra-
regional trading, further cooperation might be achieved over time. 
 India has indeed tried to demolish trade barriers, make free trade agreements, and 
intensify trade intra-regionally, but New Delhi has to keep maintaining the pace if it wishes to 
widen the gap between Beijing’s trading activity intensity in South Asia and theirs. India has 
however tried to intensify relations with its neighboring countries courtesy of Narendra 
Modi’s neighborhood first and Act East Policy. We can see that India tries to boost its 
relations with its closest neighbors like Nepal and Sri Lanka in order to maintain the image of 
the benevolent regional hegemon.21 Those efforts needs to be observed closely if India wishes 
                                                          
19 Jawad Falak, “INDIAN HEGEMONY: ROOTS OF SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT,” Strategem, 2016, 
http://www.stratagem.pk/setting-the-record-straight/indian-hegemony-roots-south-asian-conflict/. 
20 “Implacable Failures of the SAARC,” Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research, 21 June, 2017, 
https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/implacable-failures-of-the-saarc/. 
21 “PM Narendra Modi’s visit a grand success, says Sri lanka minister,” Hindustan Times, 17 May, 2017, 
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pm-narendra-modi-s-visit-a-grand-success-says-sri-lanka-
minister/story-4rair1RfTsAkocLVPeAG8N.html. 
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to improve its structural architecture in SAARC in the pursuit of regional stability and to give 
positive effect to its own sphere of influence. 
 Other aspects however, can be helped by Indonesia and Australia. This is in the sense 
that because of the maritime and land structure of the BRI, Indonesia and Australia may help 
east chinese efforts by way of the sea. This is in the sense that they can help in maintaining 
the laws of the sea in the South China Sea, and in a way would keep a portion of chinese 
attention away from South Asia. Indonesia can help in the sense that it can give an opposition 
towards Beijing in its regional ASEAN setting, while Australia can keep a strategic presence 
in the area to keep chinese expansion in check by displaying Australian regional power in its 
military joint training.22 
 Part Two: Canberra’s Deputy Duty 
 Australia as already been stated, has been commonly referred to be the deputy of the 
United States. In Canberra’s case, the problem is not in an endeavor to maintain hegemonic 
powers and presence, but to maintain a balance in economic cooperation and keeping a 
political primacy.23 We see that to be consistent with the demands and vision of the United 
States is not longer an emphasis for the Australian government after their change of 
leadership. Prime Minister Scott Morrison has expressed publicly that he is in line and sure of 
the intent of the United States in regards to their foreign policy. He even remarked on how to 
a certain extent, he understands how Trump views the globalized economy as taking a toll on 
some percentage of the world population.24 
 Scott Morrison and his past actions speak loud when we want to know his stance on 
dealing with the chinese. During his term as Acting Home Affairs Minister, he banned 
Huawei’s 5G technology to enter australia out of national security concerns.25 The next 
example would be when he held the title of treasurer and blocked the attempted purchase of S 
Kidman & Co. by a Chinese consortium out of concerns that the foreign nature of the buyer 
                                                          
22 “Australian Military in South China Sea,” SBS NEWS, 1 October, 2018, 
https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australian-military-in-south-china-sea. 
23 Wang Xiangwei, “ANTI-CHINA HYSTERIA VS NEED FOR TRADE: AUSTRALIA STRUGGLES WITH 
A RISING BEIJING,” South China Morning Post, 4 August, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/week-
asia/opinion/article/2157933/anti-china-hysteria-vs-need-trade-australia-struggles-rising. 
24 “’I think we both get it’: Scott Morrison professes admiration for Trump,” The Guardian, 17 September, 
2018, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/17/i-think-we-both-get-it-scott-morrison-
professes-admiration-for-trump. 
25 “Huawei and ZTE handed 5G network ban in Australia,” BBC News, 23 August, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45281495. 
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would be contrary to national interest.26 Other than that, he also rejected the bid by two 
Chinese companies in the sale of Ausgrid, the country’s biggest power grid, out of security 
concerns.27 So we can see here that standing still and pushing back against chinese influence 
is not an alien act for Scott Morrison. 
 Australia has even planned to make a naval base in Papua New Guinea to counter 
China’s influence in the pacific.28 Scott Morrison has stated that, “the Pacific is a very high-
priority area of strategic national security interest for Australia,” in the elaboration of the 
plan. Another plan announced this past year has also taken place to formulate a security treaty 
with Vanuatu with the similar agenda of thwarting chinese expansion in the region.29 
 Perhaps the obstacle for Australia in this regard would be in strengthening its ties with 
its northern neighbors in ASEAN. Australia’s close relation with the United States make it 
obliged to exemplify a similar stance. This obligation to imitate makes it difficult for 
Australia to not be considered as an outsider in Southeast Asia particularly when discussing 
the security aspect of the South China Sea. Recalling that ASEAN member states have 
different views on justifying or defying chinese influence in the area, Australia might have a 
hard time in maintaining good relations with the regional institution of ASEAN as the closest 
political structure in the region. 
 The triage here might be able to help Australia in maintaining a strategic balance in 
their relations with China and ASEAN, which is through Indonesia. We can argue that 
Indonesia, as one of the prominent countries in ASEAN can in fact provide arguments and 
rationale to the rest of ASEAN to include Australia in handling the South China Sea dispute. 
We can argue that India might also be of help in the sense of keeping the strategic partnership 
close with Australia in the future. The trade partnership between India and Australia might be 
                                                          
26 Coco Feng, Qing Ying, Zeng Jia, Wang Liwei, “New Australian PM Has History of Blocking Chinese 
Investment,” Caixin Global, 24 August, 2018, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-08-24/new-australian-pm-
has-history-of-blocking-chinese-investment-101318546.html. 
27 Ibid. 
28 “Australia plans naval base in Papua New Guinea to curb China’s Pacific Influence,” South China Morning 
Post, 20 September, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/2164982/australia-plans-naval-
base-papua-new-guinea-curb-chinas. 
29 “Australia and Vanuatu to negotiate security pact to head off China expansion,” The Telegraph, 22 June 2018, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/25/australia-vanuatu-negotiate-security-pact-head-china-expansion/. 
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apt for Canberra in maintaining a strong standing against the tide of chinese economic 
influence just from looking at the past year’s trade activities alone.30 
To summarize, Indonesia is more apt in providing political assistance in the 
multilateral setting of the South China Sea dispute, while India is at a better capacity to 
provide Australia the necessary economic cooperation needed to sustain a prolonged attempt 
at countering chinese influence in their region with respect to this new Trilateralism. With 
Australia’s close relations with the United States, the triage might have more military 
firepower if it comes to it. 
Part Three: Jakarta, the Giant in Bondage 
Indonesia, as one of the leading actors in Asia, especially in the Southeast region, also 
has a lot to say in the matter. Of course, one of the movement by China that is clashing with 
Indonesia’s interest has to be the South China Sea dispute. Another would be China’s rapid 
investment that is being poured to various Indonesian infrastructure projects all over the 
country. This prompts Indonesia to have the need to balance their encounter and relations 
with China in the sense that they want to maintain themselves to not be engulfed by foreign 
dominance. 
 The South China Sea dispute has been going on for a while and it has split the 
Southeast Asian or ASEAN bloc. The split comes in the various forms of support or denial 
for chinese presence in the area. One significant shift is the change of stance from the 
government of the Phillipines after Rodrigo Duterte took power.31 The significance comes 
also from the fact that one of the recent chairmanship for ASEAN was  held by the 
Philippines, thus Duterte’s distaste for the United States might complicate the ASEAN 
Centrality that is currently being built by the regional bloc. That is also compounded by the 
overlapping claims by various member states in the area. The overlap thus convolutes any 
attempt at making a solution to counter chinese military expansion in South China Sea.  
                                                          
30 Kirtika Suneja, “Australia committed to concluding a high-quality FTA with India, says Australian High 
Commissioner,” The Economic Times, 8 August, 2018, 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/australia-committed-to-concluding-a-high-
quality-fta-with-india-says-australian-high-commissioner/articleshow/65328506.cms. 
31 Andreo Calonzo, “’I Need China’: Duterte’s Pivot to Beijing Shows Signs of Payoff,” Bloomberg, 12 April, 
2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-11/duterte-s-pivot-to-china-shows-some-signs-of-
economic-payoff. 
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 The second issue encompass the seemingly unending financial penetration by Beijing 
towards Indonesia’s infrastructure building. Out of 33 Indonesian infrastructural projects that 
can be argued to be strategically beneficial for BRI, 14 of them are already in the planning 
stage.32 We can see how this would be troublesome in maintaining limited dependence 
amongst foreign investment. On the other hand you have a need for infrastructure, but also to 
maintain a significant amount of people employed. This is problematic in the reality that 
many chinese projects employ their own citizens in Indonesia.33 
The South China Sea is not only a legal dispute, but also considered by many as a 
security issue. Seen by how Indonesia’s endeavor to materialize their maritime axis is 
accompanied by several attempts at enforcement of the law, rather than its judgment. One 
example is when in 2016, a chinese fishing boat was towed away by an Indonesian warship 
due to their violation of Indonesia’s maritime territory.34 Another fact to add is that 
Indonesia’s current maritime affairs and fisheries minister, Susi Pudjiastuti is sort of a 
hardline person in regards to Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty. Blowing towed away ships 
and expressing her frustration to maritime violators is one of the trademark of her 
incumbency. These actions however, risk of alienating other ASEAN members if Indonesia 
does its part too unilaterally. Indonesia is in dire need of balancing its every act if they want 
their vision of a secured Indo-Pacific under a maritime axis to not be under fire. 
This massive infrastructure undertaking by the current government of Indonesia may 
indeed prove to be its largest intake of foreign investment, however in a society where 
foreign assistance can be seen as an ammunition for offensive maneuvers in domestic 
politics, we need to view the threat of China in a different prism. Indonesian Sinophobia is 
still quite prominent in its society, ethnic chinese Indonesian citizens are still in a significant 
extent regarded as foreign in Indonesia and is without question would extend to 
‘indigineous’, mainly Javanese, muslim male who are partnering with said ‘chinese’.35 
Whether the chinese in discussion are actually from China or a chinese descent, Indonesian 
                                                          
32 Pramesha Saha, “ Indonesia’s ‘soft balancing’ against China,” Observer Research Foundation, 30 May, 2018, 
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/41210-indonesia-soft-balancing-against-china/. 
33 Rizky Jaramaya, “ JK: Cina Investasi Oke, Tapi Jangan Bawa Banyak Tenaga Kerja,” Republika.co.id, 28 
November, 2017, https://republika.co.id/berita/ekonomi/bisnis-global/17/11/28/p036rj440-jk-cina-investasi-oke-
tapi-jangan-bawa-banyak-tenaga-kerja. 
34 Hannah Beech and Muktita Suhartono, “A ‘Little Bit of a Nut Case’ Who’s Taking On China,” The New York 
Times, 8 June, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/world/asia/indonesia-fishing-boats-china-
poaching.html. 
35 Johannes Nugroho, “Why anti-Chinese sentiments persist in Indonesia,” Today Online, 9 September, 2016, 
https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/why-anti-chinese-sentiments-persist-indonesia. 
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society still have a vague hatred towards them, and it endangers even the slightest 
cooperation by the current administration to be interpreted as a concession to foreign 
powers.36 
 A summary of Indonesia’s goal in this strategic goal can be argued to encompass 
ASEAN centrality, Indo-Pacific security, and the Maritime Axis doctrine. In ASEAN 
centrality, I believe that Indonesia must pursue it fully multilaterally in accordance with the 
framework of the ASEAN Community of 2025 with its entailed three pillars. Indonesia has 
even advocated an ASEAN patrol of the South China Sea,37 we can argue that this is one of 
Indonesia’s effort to put ASEAN centrality in its maritime foreign policy. The Indo-Pacific 
aspect however is where India and Australia can assist Indonesia. With Australia’s 
counterbalance and its closeness to the United States, we can see that it can provide ample 
military support even though it is only in the from of militarily flexing in joint exercises. 
India can also help Indonesia in the sense that the ever nearing ties between Modi’s and 
Jokowi’s government may prove to be a great asset in the future in combating China’s 
relentless expansion in the region. Thus all of those help and emphasis would help Indonesia 
in finally achieving its visioned Maritime Axis through the balancing of foreign investment 
and national integrity. 
Conclusion: A Takeaway of the Triage 
 The conclusion that I will present here will take inspiration from several points 
addressed by the panel of experts meeting in Brookings India back in 22 August 2018. In the 
discussion of the Indonesia-India-Australia trilateralism, the panel of experts come from 
various backgrounds. Dino Patti Djalal, the former Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister gives 
his take on Indonesia’s perspective. Peter Varghese delivers his insights on Australia’s 
standing in this trilateralism as the former Australian Foreign Affairs Secretary. Shivshankar 
Menon as the former Indian Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor is the one 
conveying the Indian perspective on the issue. I will also add my own previous point to 
compound the concluding remarks of this paper. 
                                                          
36 Herdaru Purnomo, “Lagi-lagi Antek Asing, Jokowi: Emang Gampang Rebut Freeport?,” CNBC Indonesia, 3 
November, 2018, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20181103134659-4-40439/lagi-lagi-antek-asing-
jokowi-emang-gampang-rebut-freeport. 
37 Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s New About Indonesia’s ‘Push’ for ASEAN South China Sea Patrols?,” 
The Diplomat, 20 March, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/whats-new-about-indonesias-push-for-asean-
south-china-sea-patrols/.  
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 In regards to Indonesia, we need to see that it is currently in the process of 
materializing its maritime dominance and superiority in the global context through the Indo-
Pacific concept and its maritime axis doctrine. This is also with their ASEAN centrality in 
mind. India on the other hand, is trying its best to counter both the hegemonic contestation 
from its direct rival Pakistan and added with Chinese assistance. The problem is then gaining 
more weight from the lack of functioning regionalism in South Asia. In the context of 
Australia, we see a United States deputy that is almost as ruthless as the global hegemon. 
However we need to see an Australian government that is more included within the 
framework of its southeast asian partners. Jokowi’s leadership of Indonesia has shown an 
increasing liking on ASEAN-Australia relations, that however cannot be the only aspect that 
Australia can rely on in regards to strengthening its ties with its northern neighbors. Those 
are, I believe, the obstacles of each Leviathans. 
They also possess great potential in regards to the synergy that they can emit towards 
their common cause. Indonesia’s ever-increasing prominence in the global economy and its 
continuous contribution to ASEAN may indeed realize the ASEAN Community in time and 
in turn would solidify and legitimize their regional hegemony. This is in the context of 
expanding Indonesia within the scope of ASEAN centrality. India would be able to challenge 
chinese expansion in regards to investments and financing in Indonesia and Australia, India 
would easily do this if Indonesia and Australia successfully do their part. This is of course 
while still maintaining a strategic observation towards Pakistan and the chinese expansion in 
South Asian politics ans economy. The new government leader Scott Morrison’s track record 
of maintaining a strategic balance between the economic benefits of chinese trading and 
investment cooperation and the maintenance of national security may indeed supplement the 
triage with ample trilateral standing. Coupled with the fact that Australia can give the triage a 
significant amount of military support when needed. 
All of those would be in the purpose of solidifying each of their respective regional 
hegemony. They do this due to the structural nature of the international system that require all 
of the three countries to comply with the current international architecture which is 
comprised of an arbitrarily drawn spheres of influence and regions. Regionalism might be 
important in maintaining a strategic advantage in their respective areas, however the 
maintenance of their regional superiority I believe is more important than the endeavor to 
construct a regional institution itself. With that said, I believe that each countries already 
respect the other’s sphere of influence, and that in turn provide an ample baseline for this 
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trilateral relationship to ensue. Again, the region based hegemony international architecture 
and the normative understanding of each countries’ spheres of influence is what drive this 
trilateralism. That is all done for the sake of  keeping the status quo against the revisionist 
power of the People’s republic of China. 
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